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Abstract
[Excerpt] In Ricci v. DeStefano, the "New Haven Firefighters" case, whitefirefighters and one Hispanic
firefighter sued the city of New Haven, Connecticut and city officials under Title VII. The plaintiffs claimed
the city had committed intentional discrimination or disparate treatment against them when the city
disregarded the results of promotion examinations that had an adverse effect on black and Hispanic
applicants. The Supreme Court sustained the claim.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia invited attorneys in subsequent cases to consider arguing that the
disparate impact theory of employment discrimination is unconstitutional. He reasoned as follows:
• The Constitution prohibits the government from committing disparate treatment.
• Therefore, the government may not enact laws that requirean employer to commit disparate treatment.
• An employer who abandons a practice that has a disparate impact commits disparate treatment against the
persons whom the practice favors because the employer seeks to increase the percentage of black applicants
whom the practice favors.
• An employer who abandons a practice that has a disparate impact in order to avoid being sued by members
of the class which the practice disfavors has been required by the government to commit disparate treatment.
Disparate impact is thus unconstitutional in Justice Scalia's view, but his reasoning reflects a misunderstanding
of the theory of disparate impact and how it proves discrimination. When disparate impact is understood
correctly, no constitutional issue arises.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 ("Title VII" or the "Act") 
prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from 
discriminating against workers or denying them employment 
opportunities on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 
Michael Evan Gold holds a bachelor of arts from the University of California at Berkeley and a 
bachelor of laws from Stanford University. He teaches courses on ethics, labor and employment 
law, and employment discrimination law at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations at Cornell University. 
1
 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2006). 
References to section numbers in this essay pertain to this statute. 
2
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2006). 
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The Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which 
receives, investigates, and conciliates charges of discrimination and 
occasionally sues to enforce the Act.3 Except where the context demands 
otherwise, I will use "employers" to stand for all of the agents who are 
prohibited from discriminating, "race" to stand for all of the prohibited 
bases of discrimination, "black applicants" to stand for all of the classes 
protected by the Act, "white applicants" to stand for all of the 
comparators to whom protected classes compare themselves, and 
"hiring" to stand for all of the employment contexts to which the Act 
applies. 
In Ricci v. DeStefano,4 the "New Haven Firefighters" case, white 
firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter sued the city of New Haven, 
Connecticut and city officials under Title VII. The plaintiffs claimed the 
city had committed intentional discrimination or disparate treatment5 
against them when the city disregarded the results of promotion 
examinations that had an adverse effect6 on black and Hispanic 
applicants. The Supreme Court sustained the claim.7 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia invited attorneys in 
subsequent cases to consider arguing that the disparate impact theory of 
employment discrimination is unconstitutional.8 He reasoned as follows: 
• The Constitution prohibits the government from 
committing disparate treatment. 
• Therefore, the government may not enact laws that require 
an employer to commit disparate treatment.9 
• An employer who abandons a practice that has a disparate 
impact commits disparate treatment against the persons 
whom the practice favors because the employer seeks to 
increase the percentage of black applicants whom the 
practice favors. 
• An employer who abandons a practice that has a disparate 
impact in order to avoid being sued by members of the 
class which the practice disfavors has been required by the 
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (West 2006). 
' 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
See text at nn.35-37 below. 
See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
1
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658. 
8
 "[I]t is clear that Title VII not only permits but affirmatively requires [remedial race-based actions] 
when a disparate-impact violation would otherwise result. But if the Federal Government is 
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is also prohibited from enacting 
laws mandating that third parties — e.g., employers, whether private, State, or municipal — 
discriminate on the basis of race. Title VIFs disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the 
scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make 
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision making is . . . 
discriminatory." Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
9
 Id. 
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Disparate impact is thus unconstitutional in Justice Scalia's view," but 
his reasoning reflects a misunderstanding of the theory of disparate 
impact and how it proves discrimination. When disparate impact is 
understood correctly, no constitutional issue arises. 
II. HISTORY OF THE TERM "DISCRIMINATION" 
In the first edition of their treatise EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW, Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman identified the two 
principal theories of discrimination under Title VII. They called one of 
these theories "disparate treatment," which refers to intentional 
discrimination. In a disparate treatment case, the evidence must show 
that an employer denied an employment opportunity to a black applicant 
and the employer's reason was race. The other theory Schlei and 
Grossman called "disparate impact," which refers to unintentional 
discrimination. In a disparate impact case, the evidence must show that 
an employment practice denied employment opportunities to black 
applicants as compared to white applicants, and the practice was not job 
related or a business necessity.12 The Supreme Court adopted Schlei and 
Grossman's terminology in 197713 and has continued to use it as recently 
as 2009.14 
Schlei and Grossman, like other authorities in the field, refer to 
disparate treatment and disparate impact as theories, not as distinct legal 
claims.15 The legal theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact 
are not claims in and of themselves, but rather ways of proving a claim.16 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. held the same view. In Connecticut v. Teal, 
he wrote: 
while disparate-treatment cases focus on the way in which an 
individual has been treated, disparate-impact cases are 
concerned with the protected group. . . . The Court, 
"id. 
12
 BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12 
(1976). 
13
 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
14
 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009). 
15
 See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAL, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 165 (2d ed. 2001). 
See id. (referring to disparate treatment and disparate impact as "mode[s] of proof for a Title VII 
claim). 
17
 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting) (citation omitted) (italics 
in original). 
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disregarding the distinction drawn by our cases, repeatedly 
asserts that Title VII was designed to protect individual, not 
group, rights. . . . But this argument confuses the aim of Title 
VII with the legal theories through which its aims were 
intended to be vindicated. It is true that the aim of Title VII is 
to protect individuals, not groups. But in advancing this 
commendable objective, Title VII jurisprudence has 
recognized two distinct methods of proof. In one set of 
cases—those involving direct proof of discriminatory intent— 
the plaintiff seeks to establish direct, intentional 
discrimination against him. . . . In disparate-impact cases, by 
contrast, the plaintiff seeks to carry his burden of proof by 
way of inference—by showing that an employer's selection 
process results in the rejection of a disproportionate number of 
members of a protected group to which he belongs. From 
such a showing a fair inference then may be drawn that the 
rejected applicant, as a member of that disproportionately 
excluded group, was himself a victim of that process' "built-in 
headwinds."18 
A few years later, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor expressed the same view in a section of her opinion in 
which all other justices participating in the case joined or concurred: 
Several of our decisions have dealt with the evidentiary 
standards that apply when an individual alleges that an 
employer has treated that particular person less favorably than 
others because of the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. In such "disparate treatment" cases . . . the 
plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a 
discriminatory intent or motive . . . . 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. this Court held that a plaintiff 
need not necessarily prove intentional discrimination in order 
to establish that an employer has violated [Title VII]. . . . The 
factual issues and the character of the evidence are inevitably 
somewhat different when the plaintiff is exempted from the 
need to prove intentional discrimination. The evidence in 
these "disparate impact" cases usually focuses on statistical 
disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing 
explanations for those disparities. 
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that 
typically dominate disparate impact cases do not imply that 
the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where 
Id. (italics in original; underline added). 
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disparate treatment analysis is used. 
I agree with Schlei and Grossman and Justices Powell and 
O'Connor that disparate treatment and disparate impact are ways of 
proving the same thing, namely, discrimination. The following questions 
arise: what is discrimination, and how is it proven by disparate treatment 
and disparate impact? 
Because Congress did not define "to discriminate" in Title VII, we 
assume that this verb carries its ordinary English meaning in the statute.20 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides this etymology: Latin 
discriminare from discrimen -minis "distinction", from discernere 
DISCERN.21 The root meaning of "to discriminate," therefore, is simply to 
distinguish, and so the verb was used for generations. In the early 
seventeenth century, "to discriminate" meant to make or constitute a 
difference in or between. George Grote, for example, wrote of 
"capacities which discriminate one individual from another."22 The point 
of view of the verb at that time was objective, not subjective; the 
differences inhered in the objects being compared, not in the mind of the 
agent observing them. By the middle of the seventeenth century, 
however, use of the verb was becoming more subjective in viewpoint. 
At that time "to discriminate" meant to distinguish with the mind; 
perceive the difference between. Isaac Barrow wrote, "We take upon us 
. . . to discriminate the goats from the sheep."23 Substantially the same 
meaning carried into the late eighteenth century, but by then "to 
discriminate" had become fully subjective, focusing only on the mind of 
the agent. Henry Thomas Buckle wrote, "It is by reason, and not by 
faith, that we must discriminate in religious matters . . ."24 and the United 
States Scientific American stated, "A simple energy measurement serves 
[i.e., allows us] to discriminate between the two kinds of event."25 The 
emotional significance of the verb appears to have been either neutral (as 
a synonym of "to distinguish") or positive (as in having discriminating 
taste). 
The sense in which "to discriminate" is most commonly used today 
first appeared in the late nineteenth century: to "make a distinction in the 
treatment of different categories of people or things, especially unjustly 
or prejudicially against people on grounds of race, colour, sex, social 
status, age, etc."26 Mark Twain wrote of being "discriminated against on 
19
 487 U.S. 977, 985-987 (1988)(citations omitted) (underline added) (Justice Kennedy not 
participating). 
20
 F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence o f . . . a definition, we construe a 
statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning."). 
21
 THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 386 (9th ed. 1995). 
22
 GEORGE GROTE, FRAGMENTS ON ETHICAL SUBJECTS 59 (1876). 
23
 ISAAC BARROW, THE WORKS OF ISAAC BARROW 219(1845). 
24
 HENRY BUCKLE, HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND 253 (1858). 
25
 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 689 (Thumb Index ed. 1993). 
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account of my nationality"27 in his non-fiction work, A TRAMP ABROAD. 
Fifty years later, Reinhold Niebuhr opined in his study on ethics and 
politics that "[ejducational suffrage tests ... would discriminate in favor 
of the educated Negro against the servile, old-time Negro."28 The 
viewpoint remained subjective, but the connotation of the verb had 
become negative because the notion of unjust advantage had been added 
to the root meaning of "to distinguish." Mark Twain was asserting that 
discrimination against Americans was unjust; Reinhold Niebuhr believed 
that all Negroes should be enfranchised. 
Thus, the prevalent understanding of "to discriminate" in the United 
States in the twentieth century included a notion of an unjust 
disadvantage. This understanding was grounded on a strong sense of the 
basic equality of persons and an equally strong reaction to being the 
victim of an unjust distinction. When Congress enacted Title VII, a 
definition of "to discriminate" was no more necessary than a definition 
of other terms in the statute, such as "race" or "to segregate." Americans 
understood then, as we do now, that to discriminate is to make an unjust 
distinction. This definition preserves the older sense of "to 
distinguish"—discrimination always involves a comparison—and adds 
the modern value judgment of injustice.29 
Accordingly, to discriminate in Title VII meant, and continues to 
mean, "to distinguish unjustly." In the context of employment, "to 
distinguish" means to grant an employment opportunity to one person 
and to deny it to another person. An employer can deny an employment 
opportunity to a worker in many ways that are unjust. The words 
"because of. . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"30 in Title VII 
indicate that it applies only to these recognized bases of injustice. 
Therefore, under the Act "to discriminate . . . because of race" means to 
deny an employment opportunity to a worker on the basis of race. 
III. TITLE VII 
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact are methods by 
which a plaintiff can prove that an employer unjustly distinguished in the 
award of employment opportunities. The injustice in both models of 
proof lies in the basis of the distinction, which is race. In disparate 
treatment, the basis of the distinction is race because race is the 
MARK TWAIN, A TRAMP ABROAD 172 (Harper 1879). 
28
 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 80 (Scribner 2003). 
29
 The popular understanding of "to discriminate" continues to change. I often hear younger persons 
make the verb transitive, and they sometimes omit the element of comparison, making the word into 
a synonym of "to disadvantage." Thus, "He discriminated me" can mean simply "He treated me 
badly." These changes, though increasingly common, are not yet standard. 
30
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2006). 
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employer's conscious reason for the distinction.31 In disparate impact, 
the basis of the distinction is also race, though race is not the employer's 
conscious reason for the distinction. Instead, the employer's reason for 
the distinction is an employment practice which the employer intends to 
serve a non-racial purpose.32 The practice, however, does not serve its 
purpose. The practice serves only to distinguish between black and 
white applicants. Thus, the injustice of a practice with a disparate impact 
is that race is the actual basis for the distinction. 
A. Disparate Treatment 
The elements of the disparate treatment model of proof are as 
follows: 
• The employer is covered by Title VII; 
• The employer offered a particular employment opportunity; 
• The plaintiff was qualified for the opportunity; 
• The plaintiff was willing to accept the opportunity; 
• The employer denied the opportunity to the plaintiff; and 
• The employer's reason for the denial was the plaintiffs 
33 
race. 
The first five elements are normally proven with direct, 
conventional evidence. For example, the second element might be 
proven by evidence that the employer advertised for a mechanic, and the 
third element by evidence that the plaintiff had five years' experience as 
a mechanic. The last element can be proven with the same sort of 
evidence.34 For example, the supervisor who decided which applicant to 
hire may have said the firm already had enough black mechanics. More 
often, however, the last element is proven by inference.35 For example, 
the white applicants whom the employer hired for the job may have had 
less training and experience than the plaintiff. Although this evidence 
does not prove conclusively that the employer rejected the plaintiff 
because of race, the evidence is sufficiently suggestive of a racial motive 
to expect the employer to offer a non-discriminatory explanation for not 
hiring the black mechanic. 
Typically, an employer defends against disparate treatment by 
See Michael Evan Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of Employment Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175,218(2001). 
32
 M a t 218-36. 
33
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see GOLD, supra note 31 at 192. 
34
 Id. at 181. 
See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) ("Outright admissions of impermissible racial 
motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence.")-
178 TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS [Vol. 16:2 
attacking the proof of one or more elements of the prima facie case, for 
example, by disputing the plaintiffs qualifications or by identifying a 
non-discriminatory reason for denying the opportunity to the plaintiff. 
An employer may also raise two affirmative defenses: relying in good 
faith on an opinion letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,36 or basing a decision on religion, sex, or national origin 
when that characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification for the 
opportunity.37 
The elements in the disparate treatment model of proof show that 
the employer has distinguished between a black and a white applicant in 
the award of an employment opportunity. The defenses are ways of 
negating this showing. Direct attack on one of the elements of the prima 
facie case would obviously serve this purpose. The affirmative defenses 
serve the same purpose. If the employer relied in good faith on an 
opinion letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
then the basis of the employer's act was the letter, not race. If the job 
required a worker to be a woman, then the basis of the employer's refusal 
to hire men was not their gender, but the requirements of the job. 
Therefore, the elements of the disparate treatment model of proof 
and the defenses address whether or not the employer was guilty of 
discrimination as we normally use that word. An employer who 
disadvantages a worker because the worker is black unjustly 
distinguishes between black and white applicants in awarding 
employment opportunities. 
B. Disparate Impact 
Disparate impact also shows that the employer was guilty of 
discrimination as we normally use the word. The elements of the 
disparate impact model of proof are as follows: 
• The employer is covered by Title VII; 
• The employer offered employment opportunities; 
• The qualified labor pool is composed of this number of 
black applicants and that number of white applicants; 
• The employer maintained an employment practice that had 
an adverse effect on black applicants as compared to white 
applicants in the qualified labor pool; and 
• The practice was not job related.38 
ib
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12 (West 2006). 
37
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2006). 
38
 See E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274-5 (11th Cir. 2000) (outlining the 
elements of disparate impact in terms of gender discrimination); New York City Transit Auth. V. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 569 (1979) (outlining exception for "job related" criteria). 
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The first two elements are the same as in disparate treatment and 
can be proven with conventional evidence. The other elements require 
explanation. 
The third element of disparate impact is the racial composition of 
the qualified labor pool.39 The qualified labor pool is the group of 
workers who are willing and able to perform a job. I maintain that Title 
VII protects only workers in the qualified labor pool. However, if this 
proposition strikes the reader as too broad, I would be content with the 
alternative proposition that only workers in the qualified labor pool are 
entitled to relief under the Act. Congress did not intend to force an 
employer to offer a job to an unqualified worker or to pay damages to a 
worker who was unwilling to take the job.40 
IV. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
It follows that evidence in a disparate impact case must pertain to 
the qualified labor pool, just as evidence in a disparate treatment case 
brought by an individual must pertain to a willing and able plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs in disparate impact cases rarely offer direct evidence of the 
qualified labor pool. Observing it for most jobs is impractical. Plaintiffs 
may know which skills a job requires, but lack the resources to obtain 
from all the workers in the job market reliable information regarding 
which skills they have and whether they would accept the job if it were 
offered to them.41 Consequently, plaintiffs resort to proxies. 
A. The Use of Proxies 
A proxy represents something else, which is called the universe. If 
the proxy represents the universe, we know that what is true of the proxy 
is true of the universe. Usually, the proxy is smaller than the universe. 
Consider a public opinion poll in which a thousand randomly selected 
persons constitute a proxy for the general population. Sometimes a 
proxy is larger than the universe. Suppose we are planning to build a 
new school, and we want to know how many lockers to place in the 
gymnasium. We cannot ask students who will attend the school whether 
they will participate in sports and need lockers, but we can look at 
numerous other schools, observe the percentage of students in those 
schools who use lockers in the gymnasium, and extrapolate for our 
3V
 EEOC Compliance Manual §15-VI, 2006 WL 4673429. 
40
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12 (West 2006). 
41
 See Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006); Alabama v. United States, 
304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.) off dper curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); WAYNE C. CURTIS, STATISTICAL 
CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE 91 (1983). 
180 TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS [Vol. 16:2 
school. I will use the term "fair proxy" to refer to a proxy that 
accurately represents the relevant universe. 
In employment discrimination cases, the relevant universe is the 
qualified labor pool. A common proxy is the applicant pool for the job. 
This proxy is fair in most cases because it captures interest well 
(applicants are willing to accept the job) and captures qualifications 
fairly well (workers usually do not apply for jobs which they are unable 
to perform), as courts have recognized for several decades.42 More 
accurately, there is usually no reason to believe that any difference exists 
in the ability of black and white applicants to perform a job for which 
they have applied or in their willingness to accept the job. Another 
common proxy for the qualified labor pool is the general population, 
which is a fair proxy when the job is unskilled or the employer provides 
training in the necessary skills.43 
A fair proxy allows us to learn the racial composition of the 
qualified labor pool. Knowing what percentage of these workers is white 
and what percentage is black lays the basis for the next element in a 
disparate impact case, namely, proof that a specific practice of the 
employer denies opportunities to proportionally more black than white 
applicants who are interested in and qualified for the job. I will say that 
such a practice has an "adverse effect" on black applicants. 
B. Statistical Theory 
The archetypical disparate impact case involves a written test on 
which white applicants are more successful than black applicants. For 
example, suppose that 90% of white test takers and 75% of black test 
takers pass. The question is whether the test has an adverse effect on the 
latter. The persons who took the test are a fair proxy for the qualified 
labor pool. This proxy captures interest in the job because workers 
rarely expend the effort to take a test for a job they would not accept. 
We cannot know a priori how well this proxy captures ability, but we 
begin with the assumption, absent evidence to the contrary, that ability is 
distributed proportionally across racial groups. As a result, we expect 
that proportionally as many black as white applicants will pass the test. 
Does the fact of a disparity between expectation and observation 
prove that the test has an adverse effect? The answer is no because a 
degree of randomness affects even a fair process. The true effect of a 
"Where a validity study is conducted in which tests are administered to applicants... the sample of 
subjects must be representative of the normal or typical candidate group for the job or jobs in 
question. This further assumes that the applicant sample is representative of the minority population 
available for the job or jobs in question in the local labor market." U.S. v. Georgia Power Co., 474 
F.2d 906, 916 (1973). 
43
 See, e.g. Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 179 Fed App'x 366, 381-82 (6th Cir 2006); see also 
CURTIS, supra note 41 at 91. 
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test is its normal outcome over many administrations, not its effect in a 
single administration.44 Typically, however, plaintiffs know only the 
result of a single administration of a test. Can a single administration 
prove anything? The answer is yes, thanks to statistical theory. If the 
outcome of a single trial is distant enough from the normal expectation 
(in other words, is unlikely to have occurred by chance), it is 
"statistically significant." In plain English, the disparity is meaningful.45 
There is reason to believe that the outcome was not simply a random 
variation in a fair process, but rather was influenced by a specific cause. 
This reasoning can be applied to our example of a written test upon 
which an employer makes hiring decisions. We begin with the 
expectation that equal percentages of black and white applicants will 
pass the test. We observe that 90% of white applicants but only 75% of 
black applicants pass. Our statistician informs us that this result is 
statistically significant and is unlikely to occur by chance. We conclude 
that the test has an adverse effect on black workers. 
Proof that an employment practice has an adverse effect on black 
applicants completes the plaintiffs' prima facie case of disparate impact. 
Yet a statistically significant disparity—an adverse effect—does not 
prove discrimination. We know that the disparity probably has a cause, 
but we do not know what the cause is.46 In our example, if the cause 
were that the black applicants were less qualified for the job than the 
white applicants, the cause would be just; if the cause were the race of 
the applicants, the cause would be unjust. Accordingly, the next step in 
the disparate impact model of proof is to determine whether the cause of 
the disparity is just or unjust. 
This point can be understood intuitively. Imagine that someone tosses a coin 100 times and 
records the outcome, then conducts 999 more such trials, records the results, and averages them. We 
would expect that the average outcome over the 1,000 trials would be very close to 50% heads and 
50% tails. We would not, however, expect the outcome of every individual trial to have the same 
distribution. Similarly, although we would expect that equal percentages of black and white test 
takers would pass a fair test that is administered 1,000 times, we should not expect the pass rates on 
any given administration of the test to be equal. 
This point can also be understood intuitively. Suppose A offers to make a bet with B. One of 
them will toss a coin one hundred times. A will win ten dollars for each result of heads in excess of 
fifty; B will win ten dollars for each result of tails in excess of fifty. B accepts the bet. The outcome 
is sixty-five heads and thirty-five tails, and B loses one hundred fifty dollars. B might well think, 
"Sixty-five, thirty-five is a very unusual result. There is a big disparity between what I expected, 
which was fifty-fifty or something close to it, and what occurred. Something strange happened." 
46
 Think again of A's bet with B. If B supplied the coin and did the tossing, B would have no good 
reason to think that the cause of the disparity was suspicious. But if A supplied the coin, B might 
suspect that the coin was loaded; or if A did the tossing, B might suspect that A knew a trick for 
tossing heads. 
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V. DEFENSES 
A. Business Necessity 
The principal defense in the disparate impact model of proof is 
known as "business necessity."47 The employer can vindicate an 
employment practice that has an adverse effect on black applicants by 
proving that the practice is "job related and consistent with business 
necessity."48 "Business necessity" is a term of art. It means that the 
employer must prove not that the practice is essential to the business, but 
only that the practice truly serves a non-racial business purpose. A 
practice is job related if it distinguishes workers who are qualified for a 
job from workers who are not qualified for it. A job-related practice 
serves a non-racial business purpose. 
As a matter of procedure, business necessity is an affirmative 
defense. As a matter of substance, however, an employer's failure to 
prove business necessity completes the plaintiffs' prima facie case of 
discrimination. The plaintiffs' proof that a practice has an adverse effect 
does not establish discrimination. The element of injustice has not been 
proven. A disparity, however large and however significant, can have a 
just or an unjust cause. A just cause is a practice which distinguishes on 
the basis of genuine qualifications for the job, and something else causes 
proportionally fewer black applicants to be qualified. An unjust cause is 
a practice which distinguishes on some basis other than qualifications, 
and race causes the adverse effect. 
B. Job Relatedness Disproves Adverse Effect 
If the employer proves that a practice is job related, the evidence 
demonstrates that the workers who are rejected by the practice are 
unqualified. Therefore, proof that a practice with an adverse effect on 
black applicantss is job related establishes that the cause of the disparity 
is just. The cause is black applicants' comparative lack of qualifications. 
If the employer fails to prove the practice is job related, we are left with 
an employment practice that has an adverse effect and is not job related. 
Such a practice distinguishes among applicants on some basis other than 
qualifications. As far as the evidence demonstrates, the black applicantss 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The 
touchstone is business necessity."); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973) (once plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination, burden "must shift to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."). 
48
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2006). 
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who are rejected are as qualified as the white applicantss who are 
selected. Nonetheless, although a practice that is not job related selects 
among applicants at random with respect to qualifications, the practice 
does not select at random with respect to race. That the disparity is 
statistically significant means that the practice consistently favors white 
applicants over black applicants. That is, the practice selects on the basis 
of race and, therefore, race is the cause of the disparity. 
Consider another typical case, one involving an unscored objective 
selection criterion. Suppose an employer requires that all assembly line 
workers hold a high school degree. Because proportionally more white 
than black applicants complete high school,49 the plaintiffs prove that this 
criterion has an adverse effect on black applicants. The burden then 
shifts to the employer to prove the criterion is job related or "valid." 
Proof of validity may not be based on intuition or common sense; a 
rigorous validation study must be conducted. Suppose our employer's 
study shows that the criterion predicts success on the job, that is, that 
workers who hold degrees perform the job better than workers who lack 
degrees. The employer proves that the criterion is job related. Workers 
who lack degrees are unqualified, and the disparity is caused by black 
applicants' comparative lack of qualifications. Thus, an employer who 
hires on the results of a valid selection criterion distinguishes among 
applicants based on their qualifications, not their race. It may be that 
fewer black applicants than we might expect or desire are qualified, but 
an employer has every right to hire based on qualifications. 
Now suppose the reverse: the employer fails to prove that holding a 
degree is job related. The selection criterion is not valid. It does not 
distinguish between qualified and unqualified workers, and those who 
lack a degree are as likely to succeed on the job as those who hold a 
degree. Yet because some applicants satisfy the criterion and some do 
not, the criterion distinguishes among them on some basis. What is the 
basis? The plaintiffs have proven that the criterion has a statistically 
significant adverse effect on black applicants. Therefore, the criterion 
distinguishes on the basis of race, favoring white over black applicants. 
Accordingly, an employer who hires on the basis of an invalid unscored 
objective selection criterion that has an adverse effect distinguishes 
among workers based on their race, not their qualifications.50 
It should be clear now that disparate impact does not merely 
"smoke out" intentional discrimination, as some have contended. ' 
Disparate impact proves an injustice that is independent of an employer's 
intent. 
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC, DUB NO. NCES 2010-028, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2010, Indicator 18 (2010). 
50
 Another defense to disparate impact is possible—an employer may prove good-faith reliance on 
an opinion letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. An employer is justified in 
relying on advice from the agency responsible for the protection of workers from discrimination. 
129 S.Ct. 2658 at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring), citing Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and 
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 494 at 498-499, 520-521) (2003.) 
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Let us use the term "disparate impact" to refer to an employment 
practice that has an adverse effect on black applicants and is not job 
related. The prima facie case of and defense to disparate impact, taken 
together, show whether an employer is guilty of discrimination as we 
normally use that word. An employer who uses a practice with a 
disparate impact on black applicants unjustly distinguishes between 
black and white applicants in awarding employment opportunities. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRING OPINION 
With the foregoing in the reader's mind, I will now demonstrate 
that Justice Scalia was mistaken and that disparate impact is not 
unconstitutional. He suggested that disparate impact is unconstitutional 
because the act of abandoning an employment practice with a disparate 
impact is an act of disparate treatment. Justice Scalia's thought is that 
the motivation for abandoning the practice is to increase the number of 
black applicants whom the practice favors. In truth, however, the 
motivation for the act is that the practice is irrational and unjust. 
The suggestion of unconstitutionality grew out of the facts of the 
New Haven Firefighters case.52 The city of New Haven, Connecticut 
decided which firefighters to promote to lieutenant and captain by means 
of written and oral examinations53 that ranked the candidates by their 
scores.54 Under the rule of three, each vacancy was to be filled by one of 
the top three scorers on the examinations.55 The city administered the 
examinations in 2003 and observed that they had an adverse effect on 
African-American and Hispanic candidates; the rate at which these 
groups passed the examinations was less than 80% of the rate at which 
white applicants passed.56 The city did not conduct a validation study to 
determine whether the examinations accurately predicted success on the 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009). 
53
 M a t 2665. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 The examination for captain was completed by twenty-five white, eight black, and eight Hispanic 
candidates. Of these, sixteen white, three black, and three Hispanic applicants passed. Thus, 64% 
of white candidates passed the examinations for captain, but only 38% of black and Hispanic 
applicants were successful. For the position of lieutenant, forty-three white, nineteen black, and 
fifteen Hispanic applicants completed the examinations; twenty-five white, six black, and three 
Hispanic candidates passed. Thus, 58% of white applicants passed the examinations for lieutenant, 
but only 32% of black and 20% of Hispanic applicants were successful. Based on these numbers, 
the Court wrote, "The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that 
the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination." Id. at 2677. The 
Court reached this conclusion by using the "eighty percent rule," under which a practice has an 
adverse effect if black applicants' rate of success on the practice is less than 80% of white 
applicants' rate of success. Id. at 2666. The Court appears to have adopted the eighty percent rule as 
the standard for determining whether an employment practice has an adverse effect. The rule, 
however, is irrational and should be abandoned in favor of statistical analysis. See GOLD, supra note 
31 at 222-23 (2001). 
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job. Instead, fearing lawsuits from minority candidates who had not 
passed, the city "threw out the examinations."58 White applicants who 
would have been promoted based on the examinations then filed suit. 
The Supreme Court held that the city intentionally discriminated against 
the white applicants in violation of Title VII.59 In the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy wrote that a practice with a disparate impact could 
cause an employer to commit disparate treatment;60 and for this reason, 
Justice Scalia, concurring, suggested that disparate impact may be 
unconstitutional.61 
I believe the Court was right in holding against the city for 
discarding the results of the examinations. The city did not know that 
they had a disparate impact. The city knew only that they had an adverse 
effect on black and Hispanic applicants. But, as I demonstrated above, 
adverse effect is only one element of the disparate impact model of 
proving discrimination. The other element is the lack of job relatedness, 
and of this element the city was ignorant. Because the city did not 
conduct a validation study to determine whether the examinations 
predicted success on the job, the examinations might have been valid 
and the candidates with the highest scores might have been well qualified 
for the job. Alternatively, the examinations might have been invalid and 
revealed nothing about the candidates' qualifications. Consequently, the 
city decided to ignore the results of the examinations simply because not 
enough black and Hispanic applicants passed. Thus, the city 
distinguished among workers on the basis of race and thereby 
discriminated against them in violation of Title VII.63 
Justice Scalia was as wrong as the Court's holding was right. He 
suggested that requiring employers to abandon a policy with a disparate 
impact requires employers to discriminate on the basis of race.64 To see 
the error of Justice Scalia's suggestion, let us consider the case of an 
employer who abandons a practice that has an adverse effect and is not 
to'ccil29S.Ct at 2667-68. 
5SId at 2664. 
59
 Wa t 2681,2664-65. 
60
 M a t 2674, 2681. 
61
 Id. at 2682. 
62Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2667-68. 
63
 The Court's standard of decision was that "race-based action like the City's in this case is 
impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, 
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute." Id. at 2664. 
I believe that the standard which I implicitly advocate in the text—that a practice with an adverse 
effect may be abandoned only if the practice is not job related—would satisfy the Court's standard. 
If a practice truly has a disparate impact, the employer can certainly demonstrate "a strong basis in 
evidence . . . that it would have been liable" for discrimination. Id. My standard might even be more 
rigorous than the Court's, for a strong basis in evidence might be something less than full-fledged 
proof of disparate impact. 
I disagree, however, with the Court's characterization of the employer's action in such a case as 
"race-based." As I argue in the following text, abandoning a practice that has a disparate impact is 
not a race-based action. Rather, abandoning the practice is a non-discriminatory step that rationally 
serves the legitimate interests of the employer's business. 
64
 Id. at 2682. 
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job related, that is, a practice that has a disparate impact. Let us change 
one fact of the New Haven Firefighters case so that it exemplifies this 
situation which Justice Scalia contemplated. Suppose that after noticing 
that the promotion examinations had an adverse effect on black and 
Hispanic applicants, the city had commissioned a validation study which 
revealed that the examinations were not job related. In this event, the 
city would have known that the examinations had a disparate impact. 
Contrary to Justice Scalia's contention, the city would have had lawful 
reasons to ignore the results of the examinations; indeed, the city would 
have had a legal duty to ignore the results. 
The city would have known that the examinations did not serve 
their purpose. They did not select qualified lieutenants and captains. 
Instead, they selected randomly with respect to qualifications. 
Promoting on the basis of such examinations would have been irrational 
and perhaps a violation of due process. 
The city would also have known that the examinations in fact 
selected candidates on the basis of race. One of the goals of Title VII is 
to lead employers "to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment 
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges 
of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."65 
Thus, Justice Scalia's contention is 180 degrees off the mark. To act on 
the results of examinations with the knowledge that they do not identify 
qualified candidates, but do select on the basis of race, is surely to 
commit disparate treatment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Thus, the decision to ignore the result of an examination, or to 
abandon any other practice with a disparate impact, is fully justified. 
The motivation for the decision is not race, but the flaws of the 
practice.66 Therefore, the act of abandoning a practice with a disparate 
impact is not disparate treatment, the government does not require an 
employer to commit disparate treatment, and disparate impact is not 
unconstitutional. 
I will conclude by moving the analysis to a higher level of 
abstraction, but of course reaching the same conclusion. Disparate 
treatment and disparate impact are models of proof of discrimination. 
Each in its own way proves the same thing—that an employer unjustly 
distinguishes between black and white applicants in awarding 
65
 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (citation omitted). 
One can imagine a case in which an employer abandons a practice with a disparate impact, not 
because the practice is irrational and discriminatory, but because the employer desires to increase the 
number of black applicants for the job. Such a case would be simple disparate treatment and would 
pose no threat to the theory of disparate impact. 
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employment opportunities. An employer who abandons a practice that is 
unjust because it is unjust ceases to discriminate. Ceasing to 
discriminate in order to obey the law cannot be discriminatory. 
